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Abstract. In other words, for those who monitor relative wealth accumulation and are 
unmoved by divine empathy, a disincentive to increase the rate of full manumission is 
possible. Consider slavery as overt, formal constraints to zero or even negative wealth 
accumulation; and consider freedom of ex-slaves as the perception of overt lack of formal 
wealth constraints and yet the possibility of covert, hidden or informal constrained wealth 
accumulation controls (i.e. southern Jim Crow laws); and finally, consider full 
manumission as the uninhibited opportunity to accumulate wealth at rates of entities 
without a history of slavery or with a more limited history of slavery. This definition of full 
manumission probably includes the necessity of wealth transfers to the fully manumitted 
ex-slave in transition from slavery or free ex-slave to full manumission. Nevertheless, this 
negatively bounded correlation between duration of time from the end of enslavement and 
magnitude of unexplained differences in wealth suggests the magnitude in the unexplained 
portion of white-black wealth differences increases as the length of time from the real end 
of enslavement decreases. 
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1. An introduction to 
his concept of negative correlation can be explained in a graph. Graph 1 
shows the Theory of the Negatively Bounded Correlation between 
accumulation of wealth differences among groups and groupings, including 
groups with hours of work and no wage without minimum constitutional, federal, 
and international standards. Moreover, Graph 1 shows a negative growth rates of 
differences in wealth, including discrimination, with improved standards such as 
personal, private property rights. 
 
 
Graph 1. Laws and Wealth Accumulation Differences 
Source: (Curtis, 2017). 
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Modern pressures on median income workers to cost minimize and strategically 
invest, including a low interest-earning bank savings account, suggest the 
possibility of stagnation in closing the gap of wealth differences among groups. In 
Table 1, Curtis (2017) annualizes salaries of interns, employees and executives 
with similar cost considerations, i.e. low-income, median income, and executive 
income with similar considerations, leading to only gradual differences net savings. 
Net income stagnation is researchable by considering a model of wealth 
differences, with theoretical considerations of favoritism and discrimination, 
presented in Appendix A1 and Appendix A2. 
 
Table 1. Annual Salary Pengelum with Similar Costs Considerations. 
Costs/Salary, Annualized 3,600.00 4,800.00 5,200.00 10,400.00 13,000.00 15,600.00 26,000.00 31,200.00 35,000.00 40,000.00 45,000.00 50,000.00 70,000.00 95,000.00 
401K Plan             1,950.00 1,950.00 
Auto/Auto Repairs/expenses    50.00 100.00 150.00 250.00 157.00 157.00 157.00 157.00 157.00 450.00 450.00 
Auto Fund/Payment 120.00 120.00 120.00           3,600.00 
Auto Insurance    480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.60 480.60 480.60 480.60 480.60 480.60 1,200.00 
Cleansing 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 
Dry  Cleaning, clothes 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 420.00 420.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 600.00 600.00 
DVD/Bowling/Cable 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 479.64 479.64 479.64 479.64 479.64 479.64 1,259.64 1,259.64 
Family Help 240.00 240.00 240.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 
Food 480.00 600.00 600.00 900.00 1,200.00 1,200.00 2,760.00 2,880.00 2,880.00 2,880.00 2,880.00 2,880.00 4,800.00 4,800.00 
Fees & Care  initial, MO, stamps  56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 76.00 76.00 
Gas    240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 480.00 
Insurance/Co-Pay 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 800.00 1,372.00 1,372.00 
Phone 120.00 120.00 120.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 480.00 480.00 
Rent  +Utilities  1,080.00 1,440.00 1,560.00 3,120.00 3,900.00 4,680.00 7,800.00 9,360.00 10,500.00 12,540.00 12,540.00 12,540.00 19,200.00 27,000.00 
Taxes 275.40 391.20 437.80 1,051.60 1,623.50 2,315.90 5,295.50 6,785.80 7,874.50 9,322.00 11,380.00 13,437.00 21,666.50 32,698.62 
Tithe & Offering 644.00 944.00 984.00 1,629.00 1,889.00 2,514.00 4,222.00 4,632.00 5,012.00 5,512.00 6,012.00 6,512.00 8,260.00 10,665.00 
Balance/Savings  annual  74.60 378.80 572.20 1,733.40 2,371.50 2,824.10 3,036.86 4,748.96 6,240.26 7,202.76 9,644.76 11,437.76 8,505.26 7,708.74 
Balance/Savings  Bi-Weekly Allowance  2.87 14.57 22.01 66.67 91.21 108.62 116.80 182.65 240.01 277.03 370.95 439.91 327.13 296.49 
Balance/Savings  Percent  2.07% 7.89% 11.00% 16.67% 18.24% 18.10% 11.68% 15.22% 17.83% 18.01% 21.43% 22.88% 12.15% 8.11% 
Rent+Utilities  Monthly  90.00 120.00 130.00 260.00 325.00 390.00 650.00 780.00 875.00 1,045.00 1,045.00 1,045.00 1,600.00 2,250.00 
Tithe & Offering  Percent  -17.89% -19.67% -18.92% -15.66% -14.53% -16.12% -16.24% -14.85% -14.32% -13.78% -13.36% -13.02% -11.80% -11.23% 
Rec Tithe 720.00 840.00 880.00 1,400.00 1,660.00 1,920.00 2,960.00 3,480.00 3,860.00 4,360.00 4,860.00 5,360.00 7,360.00 9,860.00 
Rec Tithe  Percent  -20.00% -17.50% -16.92% -13.46% -12.77% -12.31% -11.38% -11.15% -11.03% -10.90% -10.80% -10.72% -10.51% -10.38% 
Note: Potential Income-Potential Expense (Potential Job Change/Potential Promotion) of strategic 
divine resources (2014) of Author, completed. 
Source: [Retrieved from]. 
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Appendix 
A1. Model of Wealth Differences 
 
Let: Wij = (1-g-Σ q=1tqI)Iij + Aij + (1-g)(Σ q=1Sqij + Cij) - Gij 
Iij  = Σv=1 w’m h’ kij 
w’m = wk - δw(m)jg- Σ q=1t’q 
h’ mij = h mij - δh(m)jg 
 
where  
 
 Aij =[ A0ij(1-g-Σ q=1tqA(0)) + Σ a=1N(1,a)ij (1-g-Σ q=1tqN(1,a)) 
 + Σm=1γπ(m)ij πZ(m)ij(1-g) ] (1+ γρij ρ)(1-Σ q=1tqρ) 
+ Σ b=1N(2,b)ij (1-g- Σ q=1tqN(2,b)) - Gρij - δAjg(ρ,A0ij) 
 
A0ij =A0ij(xn0,γW(0)ijFW0F(I0(w0,h0,S0),A0(A(-1),N0(R0,M0),γ0 
ππ0Z),t0q,δ0g,γ0ρ)) 
 
πZij = (PZjZij + Σq=1SqZij – Σd=1PZ(d)jXZ(d)ij) (1 - Σ q=1tq π) 
PZ j = pZ(1 - δZjg + Σ q=1t’qZ) 
Zij = γZijПd=1XZ(d)ij β(d) 
PZ(d) j = pZ(d)(1 - δZ(d)jg - Σ q=1t’qZ) 
XZ(d)ij = xZ(d)ij - δZ(d)jg 
 
To understand the determinants of wealth by groups, consider the following wealth 
identity: 
 
Ww,t = exp{(1+iw)Ww,t-1 + (rw,t hw,t - pt cw,t)} 
 
where Wwf represents the portfolio of wealth for members of group w, at time t=1...T ; 
Ww1-1 represents the previous period portfolio of wealth for members of group iv, at time t=0...T- 
1 ; iw. represents the average interest rate earned on previous period portfolio of wealth for 
members of group w, at time t=1...T; rws represents the wages for group iv, at tune t=1...T; 
h,a represents the number of hours worked for members of group w, at time t=1...T; pr 
represents prices for goods consumed at time t=1...T; and cm,t represents the goods 
consumed by members of group w, at time 1=1...T; such that: 
 
 
 
where Ww,o are the initial assets of whites. 
Now consider the wealth identity with discrimination or. more specifically, favoritism in 
favor of members of group w. Let δk,w,t represent the variable k favoritism coefficient for 
members of group w, at time t=1...T. where δk,w,t >0 for all variables, such that equation 
[2] becomes: 
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where tilda represents the variable in absence of discrimination such that Ww,t is group w in absence of 
discrimination (favoritism) at time t=1...T, and Fw,t is the difference between the observed wealth and 
wealth in absence of discrimination due to favoritism for members of group IV at time t=1...T. The 
following comparative static analysis shows what happens to wealth with an increase in discrimination, 
such that: 
 
 
 
 
Equation [4] shows that the size of the increase in log wealth due to a unit increase in wage 
favoritism depends on the size of the rate of ream', compounded through time, and the number of hours 
worked. Similarly, equation [5] also shows that the size of the increase in log wealth due to a unit 
increase in hours-worked fiworitism depends on the size the wage rate and the compounded rate of 
return. Furthermore, equation [6] shows that the size of the reduction in log wealth due to a unit increase 
in consumption favoritism depends on the size of the price of commodity consumption and the 
compounded rate of return. Note that equation [7] shows that the size of the increase in log 
wealth due to a unit increase in initial wealth discrimination depends solely on the size of the 
compounded rate of return. Finally, equation [8] shows that the size of the increase in log wealth due to a 
unit increase in interest rate discrimination depends on the size of initial wealth, periodic savings, 
and the compounding rate of return. 
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A Model of Wealth Discrimination 
Analogous to equation [2], we can write for blacks: 
 
 
 
where WB,t  represents the portfolio of wealth for black, B, at time t=1...T ; 
WB,t-1  represents the previous period portfolio of wealth for blacks, B, at time t=0...T-1 iB 
represents the average interest rate earned on previous period portfolio of wealth for blacks, B, at 
time t=1...T; rB j represents the wages for blacks. B, at time t=1...T; hB,t represents the number of hours 
worked for blacks, B. at time t=1 ...T; pt represents prices for goods consumed at time t=1...T: 
and cB,t  represents the goods consumed by blacks, B. at time t=1...T, and where WB,o, is the initial 
assets of blacks. 
Now consider the wealth identity with discrimination or, more specifically, pure discrimination 
in against members of group B. Let δk,B,t represent the variable k favoritism coefficient for members of 
group B, at time t=1...T. where δk,B,t < 0 for all variables, such that equation [4] becomes: 
 
Let δk,B,t= - δk,B,t where δk,B,t > 0 
 
 
 
where tilda represents the variable in absence of discrimination such that WB,t  is 
group B in absence of discrimination at time t=1...T, and DB,t  is the difference 
between the observed wealth and wealth in absence of discrimination due to 
discrimination against members of group B at time t=1… T. The following comparative 
static analysis shows what happens to wealth with an increase in discrimination, such 
that: 
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Equation [11] shows that the size of the decrease in log wealth due to a unit increase in wage 
discrimination depends on the size of the rate of return, compounded through time, and the number 
of hours worked. Similarly, equation [12] also shows that the size of the reduction in log wealth due 
to a unit increase in hours-worked discrimination depends on the size the wage rate and the 
compounded rate of return. Note that equation [13] shows that a unit increase in consumption 
discrimination can overstate wealth, especially if consumption is forced below subsistence. The 
size of this effect depends on the price of the commodity and the compounded rate of return 
from savings in each period 
Furthermore, equation [14] shows that the size of the decrease in log wealth due to a  unit 
increase in initial wealth discrimination depends solely on the size of the compounded rate of 
return. Finally, equation [15] shows that the size of the decrease in log wealth due to a unit increase 
in interest rate discrimination depends on the size of initial wealth, periodic savings, and the 
compounding rate of return. 
 
A Model of Relative Wealth 
In theory, the average wealth of group B is some proportion of the average wealth of group w, 
such that, 
 
where 1/ ϕ is the theoretical proportion of wealth. If 4' ϕ equals one, then the average wealth of 
group B is the same the average wealth of w. As ϕ goes to zero, the average wealth of w becomes 
infinity times the average wealth of wimp B. As ϕ goes to infinity, the average wealth of group w 
becomes an infinitesimal proportion of the average wealth of the average wealth of group B. 
, then, 
 
such that, 
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